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Bray: Disposition Of Frozen Preembryos

DISPOSITION OF FROZEN PREEMBRYOS IN THE CASE OF
DIVORCE: NEW YORK SHOULD IMPLEMENT A MODIFIED
MUTUAL CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSENT APPROACH
Kasey Bray
I.

INTRODUCTION

When partners in New York divorce or separate with joint
preembryos left in frozen storage, the New York courts, in some
cases, may force one of the parties to have a child with his or her
former partner under the contract approach of distribution. This
approach leaves parties bound to a contract made years prior. The
first New York case concerning the disposition of preembryos did not
reach the New York Court of Appeals until more than twenty years
after the initial use of in vitro fertilization.1 Today, New York must
adapt to modern reproductive technology and adopt a clear and
effective solution for the disposition of frozen preembryos when
former partners cannot reach an agreement on disposition of their
shared genetic material.
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(“CDC”), “infertility is defined as not being able to get pregnant
(conceive) after one year (or longer) of unprotected sex.”2 Around


Second year law student at Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, Class
of 2022; B.A. in Economics, Stony Brook University (2019). I would like to thank
Professor Rena Seplowitz and my Notes Editors, Jennifer Covais and Ally Albano,
for their guidance and all of their insightful comments and advice throughout this
process. I would also like to thank my friends and family, especially my parents
Karen and Tom, for their unwavering support throughout my entire law school
career.
1
Kass v. Kass, 91 N.Y.2d 554, 564 (N.Y. 1998).
2
Infertility FAQs, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Jan. 16, 2019),
https://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/infertility/index.htm. “To get pregnant [a]
woman’s body must release an egg from one of her ovaries’ external icon
(ovulation external icon).” Id. “A man’s sperm must join with the egg along the
way (fertilize).” Id. “The fertilized egg must go through a fallopian tube external
icon toward the uterus external icon (womb).” Id. “The fertilized egg must attach
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six percent of married women ages fifteen to forty-four suffer from
infertility.3 Couples who want to have a child but suffer from
infertility can use Assisted Reproductive Technology (“ART”).4
ART is any reproductive technology that requires the management of
eggs and embryos outside of the woman’s body. 5 This includes in
vitro fertilization (“IVF”).6 If the woman cannot produce eggs, or if
either of the parties is infertile or has a severe genetic disease, the
parties can use donor eggs, donor sperm, or frozen embryos to
conceive.7
IVF is the most successful and therefore one of the most
common methods of ART.8 The United States has approximately
500 IVF centers and hundreds of thousands of frozen pre-embryos 9
preserved throughout the country. 10 IVF is a treatment in which an
ovum is removed from a woman and placed in a container with sperm
to the inside of the uterus (implantation).” Id. “Infertility may result from a
problem with any or several of these steps.” Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
In vitro fertilization (IVF), MAYO CLINIC (June 22, 2019),
https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/in-vitro-fertilization/about/pac20384716.
9
“The eggs are retrieved from the woman’s body and examined by a physician who
evaluates their quality for fertilization. Egg cells ready for insemination are then
combined with the sperm sample and allowed to incubate for approximately twelve
to eighteen hours. Successful fertilization results in a zygote that develops into a
four- to eight-cell preembryo. At that stage, the preembryos are either returned to
the woman’s uterus for implantation or cryopreserved at a temperature of −196C
and stored for possible future use.” John E.B. Meyers, FAMILY LAW IN A
NUTSHELL, 337 (6th ed. 2019) (quoting J.B. v. M.B. 783 A.2d 707, 701(N.J. 2001).
Dr. Irving King, a gynecologist who worked in the field of infertility and
reproductive endocrinology for twelve years, testified that “the currently accepted
term for the zygote immediately after division is “preembryo” and that this term
applies up until 14 days after fertilization. . . . [and] that this 14-day period defines
the accepted period for preembryo research . . . [and a]t about 14 days, . . . the
group of cells begins to differentiate in a process that permits the eventual
development of the different body parts which will become an individual.” Davis
v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 593 (Tenn. 1992).
10
Mary Pflum, Nation’s fertility clinics struggle with a growing number of
abandoned
embryos,
NBC
NEWS
(Aug.
12
2019),
https://www.nbcnews.com/health/features/nation-s-fertility-clinics-strugglegrowing-number-abandoned-embryos-n1040806.
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to be fertilized.11 Once the egg is fertilized, it is put back in the
woman’s uterus.12 Normally, IVF clinics will remove multiple eggs
at a time so that more than one is fertilized and replaced in the
uterus.13 The embryos that are not replaced can be frozen and
stored.14 IVF treatments often result in multiple pregnancies. 15
Because of the potential health complications of multiple
pregnancies, couples often decide against implanting some of the
embryos and freeze them instead. 16 There are five different options
for the remaining preembryos: storage, compassionate transfer,
disposition, donation to research, 17 and embryo donation.18
The American Fertility Society has three main ethical views
for deciding whether an embryo should be treated as property or
human life.19 On one end of the spectrum, preembryos are viewed as
humans, and therefore have the same fundamental rights as living
persons.20 On the other end of the spectrum, preembryos are
considered the same as normal human tissue.21 The middle, and most
common, position is to view preembryos with “respect greater than
that accorded to human tissue but not the respect accorded to actual
persons.”22 Under this view, although preembryos are not living and
breathing persons, they have the potential to become persons, and are
therefore afforded greater respect than regular human tissue. 23 In Roe
11

Barry R. Furrow, ET AL., HEALTH LAW HORNBOOK SERIES (3d ed. 2015).
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Sara D. Petersen, Comment: Dealing with Cryopreserved Embryos upon
Divorce: A Contractual Approach Aimed at Preserving Party Expectations, 50 L.
REV. 1065, 1069 (2003).
16
Id.
17
Fertility clinic doctor Craig Sweet explained that there are few research facilities
accepting preembryos. Id. Approximately eighteen percent of his IVF patients opt
to donate their preembryos to research, but when there are no facilities that are
willing to take them, he has to “go back to those patients and find out what they
want to do, but [he] often can’t find these people.” Id.
18
Rachel Gurevich, Options for What to Do with Extra Frozen Embryos After IVF,
VERYWELL FAMILY (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.verywellfamily.com/extraembryos-after-ivf-what-are-your-options-1960215.
19
The Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, The Moral and Legal
Status of Humans, 46 FERTILITY & STERILITY 3 29S (Supp. 1986).
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
12

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2021

3

Touro Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 2 [2021], Art. 13

860

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 37

v. Wade,24 the Supreme Court held that “the unborn have never been
recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense.”25 The law only
recognizes full rights after a live birth. 26 The Court also recognized
that the State has an interest “in the potentiality of human life” after
viability.27 Expanding on the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe, the
Supreme Court of Tennessee in Davis v. Davis28 noted that
preembryos are far from being viable. 29 Even after viability, embryos
are “accorded more respect than mere human cells because of their
burgeoning potential for life,” but are still not given the same rights
or status as a living person.30
A significant problem with ART arises when a couple
divorces after undergoing IVF and cryopreserving the remaining
embryos. Unlike the division of property, the disposition of
preembryos in a divorce is difficult because of their potential for life.
There is an issue on how to decide disposition of the preembryos if
the parties cannot agree. If the divorcing parties can agree on how
they want to distribute the preembryos, whether by thawing,
implanting, or donating the preembryos to a research facility or
another infertile couple, then there is no problem.
This Note will focus on the three main approaches to the
disposition of the remaining preembryos if the parties separate or
divorce and cannot come to an agreement on disposition. First, the
constitutional approach balances both parties’ rights granted by the
24

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Id. at 162.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 164-65. A fetus is viable when it is “potentially able to live outside the
mother’s womb” with artificial aid. Id. Viability is usually reached around 28
weeks, but a fetus may reach viability at as early as 24 weeks. Id.
28
842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
29
Id. at 595; Id. at 605 n.17 (citing Elisa K. Poole, Allocation of Decision-Making
Rights to Frozen Embryos, 4 Am. J. Fam. L. 67 (1990)) (“Left undisturbed in the
mother’s uterus, a viable fetus has an excellent chance of being brought to term and
born live. In contrast, a preembryo in a petri dish, if later transferred, has only a 1321 percent chance of achieving actual implantation.”).
30
Davis, 824 S.W.2d.at 595. The Supreme Court of Tennessee held in that
“disputes involving the disposition of preembryos produced by in vitro fertilization
should be resolved, first, by looking to the preferences of the progenitors. If their
wishes cannot be ascertained, or if there is dispute, then their prior agreement
concerning disposition should be carried out. If no prior agreement exists, then the
relative interests of the parties in using or not using the preembryos must be
weighed.” Id. at 604; see discussion infra Part III.A.
25
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Fourteenth Amendment, the right to procreate and the right not to
procreate.31 Second, the contract approach, adopted in New York,
holds that consent forms executed prior to IVF treatment are
“enforceable so long as they do not violate public policy.” 32 Third,
under the mutual contemporaneous consent approach, the preembryos
remain frozen and stored until, if ever, the parties can come to a
mutual agreement on disposition of the preembryos.33 Additionally,
this Note will also discuss a fourth approach adopted in
Massachusetts which promotes its public policy against forced
parenthood.
This Note will explain why New York should abandon the
contract approach and instead implement the mutual
contemporaneous consent approach to prevent implantation of
preembryos without the contemporaneous consent of both parties.
However, to solve the issue of disposition, this Note will argue that
New York should modify the mutual contemporaneous consent
approach so that the preembyros are thawed if the parties do not
agree to a disposition plan in a specified period of time.
Under the proposed change to the New York approach, the
consent agreement that the parties executed before IVF would be
enforceable as long as neither party contemporaneously objected at
the time of divorce. The default rule should be that if only one party
wants to use or donate the preembryos but the other does not consent,
the parties are deemed to have abandoned the preembryos which
would then be thawed. This approach differs from the normal mutual
contemporaneous consent approach because the modified default rule
in the case of the parties not agreeing on disposition of the
preembryos is thawing them.
Part II of this Note will address the Supreme Court decisions
that found the constitutional right to procreate and the conflicting
right to not procreate. Parts III, IV, and V will analyze the three
common approaches to preembryo distribution, respectively. Part VI
will analyze Massachusetts’ public policy. Part VII of this Note will
propose that New York abandon the contract approach and adopt the
mutual contemporaneous consent approach rather than
Massachusetts’ public policy approach or the constitutional approach.

31

Id. at 601.
In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 776 (Iowa 2003).
33
Id. at 783.
32
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CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO HAVE

Under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, the government cannot “deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”34 The
Constitution further protects citizens in the Ninth Amendment which
states, “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.”35
The Supreme Court in Meyer v. Nebraska 36 ruled that under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, every
individual has the right “to marry, establish a home, and bring up
children.”37 The Court found that even though “liberty” has not been
“define[d] with exactness,” previous Supreme Court decisions have
established that the right to “marry, establish a home, and bring up
children” are included. 38 Building on the decision in Meyer, the
Supreme Court held in Skinner v. Oklahoma,39 that the Fourteenth
Amendment protects procreation and marriage as basic rights
“fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”40 The
right to have a child is a basic liberty. 41 The Court further stated that
34

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
36
262 U.S. 390 (1923) (finding that Nebraska’s law prohibiting the teaching of
foreign languages in the State unconstitutionally interfered with a parent’s
fundamental right to raise their children as they please).
37
Id. at 399; In re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P.3d 579, 587 (Colo. 2018) (“We note
that the right to procreate or to avoid procreation does not depend on the means by
which that right is exercised. An individual may exercise her right to procreate
through conventional conception or IVF—or she may exercise her right to avoid
procreation through abstinence, contraception, voluntary sterilization, or even
abortion—but the nature of the right itself (to procreate or to avoid procreation)
remains the same.”).
38
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (“Without a doubt, [liberty] denotes not merely freedom
from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in
any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of
his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”).
39
316 U.S. 535 (1941).
40
Id. at 541.
41
Id.
35
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Oklahoma’s act allowing habitual criminals to be sterilized so long as
it did not affect the criminal’s general health was unconstitutional
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 42
Griswold v. Connecticut43 established the right to privacy in a
marriage.44 Here, two doctors were charged as accessories 45 after
giving “information, instruction, and medical advice . . . as to the
means of preventing conception” to a married couple. 46 The Court
found that marriage lies “within the zone of privacy created by
several fundamental constitutional guarantees.” 47 The Court noted
that it would be “repulsive to the notions of privacy” to allow police
to search a married couple’s bedroom for contraceptives.48 Similarly,
allowing a law to govern whether a married couple could use
contraceptives would invade the privacy of a marriage. 49 The Court
held in Eisenstadt v. Baird50 that both married and single individuals
have the right “to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child,” given that the right to privacy is not
a right of a married couple, but the rights of two individuals. 51 The
Court noted in Cleveland Board of Education v. LeFleur, 52 that its
decisions in previous cases 53 clearly establish that “freedom of
personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the

42

Id. at 538.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
44
Id. at 486.
45
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480. Any doctor who aided a married couple in violating
this statute could be charged as an accessory to the crime of using contraceptives.
Id. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-32 (1958 Rev.) provides, “Any person who uses any
drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall
be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more
than one year or be both fined and imprisoned.” Id.
46
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480.
47
Id. at 485.
48
Id. at 585-86.
49
Id.
50
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
51
Id. at 453.
52
414 U.S. 632 (1974) (holding that the Board of Education’s rule requiring
mandatory maternity leave without pay violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
53
The Court referenced its decisions in Skinner, Meyer, Griswold, Roe, and
Eisenstadt. Id. at 640.
43
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liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”54
The constitutional rights to procreate and to not procreate are
“negative right[s] to be free from interference” as opposed to
“affirmative right[s] to assistance.” 55 Negative rights protect a person
from unconstitutional interference by the State, but do not require
that States affirmatively act to protect those rights. 56 States are not
obligated to “take any positive action to secure fertility for infertile
individuals.”57 Consequently, the balancing test used under the
constitutional approach consistently sides in favor of a party’s right to
not procreate, with rare exceptions. 58
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH

The constitutional approach decides the disposition of
preembryos under the Fourteenth Amendment by balancing the
parties’ right to procreate and the right not to procreate.
A.

Tennessee

The Supreme Court of Tennessee in Davis v. Davis followed
the constitutional approach and decided in favor of the husband’s
right to not procreate.59 The court explained that the Supreme Court
in Griswold established the right to procreational autonomy under the
54

Id.
Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not to Procreate, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1135, 1140 (2008).
56
Christina C. Lawrence, Note, Procreative Liberty and the Preembryo Problem:
Developing a Medical and Legal Framework to Settle the Disposition of Frozen
Preembryos, 52 CASE W. RES. 721, 728-29 (2002).
57
Id. at 738.
58
Id.; Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992) (“Ordinarily, the party
wishing to avoid procreation should prevail, assuming that the other party has a
reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by means other than use of the
preembryos in question. If no other reasonable alternatives exist, then the
argument in favor of using the preembryos to achieve pregnancy should be
considered.”); Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1134 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (holding
that the wife’s compelling interest of using the preembyros because they were
likely her only chance of having a biological child outweighed her former
husband’s interest in avoiding unwanted parenthood).
59
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992).
55
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Fourteenth Amendment.60 In Davis, the court acknowledged both the
right to procreate and the right not to procreate, saying “it is
sufficient to note that, whatever its ultimate constitutional boundaries,
the right of procreational autonomy is composed of two rights of
equal significance -- the right to procreate and the right to avoid
procreation.”61
Here, the wife wanted to donate the frozen
preembryos to an infertile couple while the husband wanted to
destroy the embryos.62 The couple did not complete a consent form
or agreement to govern the disposition of the frozen embryos. 63 The
court noted that, although there was no valid consent form, the parties
should be entitled to change their minds and modify the contract as
the circumstances change even if a valid agreement was made. 64
To determine the disposition of the embryos, the court looked
to the “positions of the parties, the significance of their interests, and
the relative burdens that would be imposed by differing
resolutions.”65 The husband had childhood trauma from his parents’
own divorce and was opposed to raising a child whose biological
parents were not together. 66 On the other hand, siding with the
husband “would impose on [the wife] the burden of knowing that the
lengthy IVF procedures she underwent were futile” because the
preembryos would be destroyed. 67
The court explained that
regardless of whether the preembryos were used by the wife or
donated to another infertile couple, if the preembryos resulted in a
child, it would “impose unwanted parenthood on [the husband], with
all of its possible financial and psychological consequences.”68
Because of these burdens, the court ruled in favor of the husband’s
right to not procreate.69 The court reasoned that courts should
consider the argument of the party wishing to use the embryos if he

60

Id.
Id.
62
Id. at 590.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 597.
65
Id. at 603.
66
Id. at 604.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 603.
69
Id. at 604.
61
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or she has no “reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by
means other than use of the preembryos in question.”70
B.

New Jersey

In JB v. MB,71 the Supreme Court of New Jersey reached a
similar result as the court in Davis, and held in favor of the wife’s
right to not procreate. 72 In this case, the parties executed a consent
form prior to the IVF treatment that included a provision for the
disposition of embryos in the case of divorce. 73 The clause stated, in
the event of divorce, the IVF center would determine disposition of
the embryos, unless the court decided the disposition.74 A year after
the procedure, the couple successfully had a child together and left
seven preembryos remaining in storage. 75 The parties soon divorced,
and the husband wished to either implant the embryos or donate the
preembryos to “other infertile couples,” while his former wife wanted
the embryos destroyed because she claimed she only intended to use
them in the marriage.76
The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with the court in
Davis, where the right to not procreate should outweigh the right to
procreate.77 The husband’s right to procreate was not violated by
destruction of the embryos.78 The parties already had a daughter and
the husband would not be stopped from having more children in the
future without the use of the preembryos. 79 Allowing the husband to
use the preembryos, whether to implant or donate, would cause the
wife to be forced into having a biological child that she did not
want.80 The circumstances surrounding her decision to begin IVF
drastically changed between having a child and her marriage ending
70

Id.; Ashley Alenick, Note, Pre-Embryo Custody Battles: How Predisposition
Contracts Could Be the Winning Solution, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1879, 1891 (2017)
(“Reasonable possibility is broadly defined to include both a willingness to
undergo further IVF procedures or to adopt.”).
71
783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001).
72
Id. at 720.
73
Id. at 710.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 710.
77
Id. at 716.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 717.
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in divorce.81 Her constitutional right to not procreate was more at
risk in this situation.82
The court noted that if the parties have a valid agreement in
place, such agreement should be upheld.83 However, either party
should have the right “to change his or her mind about disposition up
to the point of use or destruction of any stored preembryos.”84 This
allows both parties to both determine disposition of the embryos and
to guard their own interests while also allowing the parties to change
their minds.85
C.

Colorado

In In re Marriage of Rooks,86 the Supreme Court of Colorado
held that when parties do not have an enforceable agreement to
determine disposition, courts should balance the parties’ “equally
valid, constitutionally based interests in procreational autonomy.” 87
Because the parties did not indicate their intention for disposition of
the embryos in the case of divorce in their consent form, the
agreement was not applicable and the court remanded the case with
instructions to apply the constitutional analysis.88
The court
enumerated a list of factors that should be considered when balancing
the parties’ interests: (1) the intended use of the preembryos, (2)
whether the party wishing to use the embryos has other means of
conceiving a child; (3) the original reasons for deciding to participate
in IVF, (4) the burden placed on the unwilling party if a child were to
be born, and (5) bad faith on the part of either party, among other
“relevant case-by-case” factors.89 The Court noted that when
applying the intended use of the preembryos factor, courts should
prioritize a party who wants to use the preembryos to become a
genetic parent over a party who wishes to donate the preembryos to
another couple.90
81

Id. at 710.
Id.
83
Id. at 719.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
429 P.3d 579 (Colo. 2018).
87
Id. at 594.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 593-95.
90
Id. at 593.
82
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Pennsylvania

In Reber v. Reiss,91 after the wife had been diagnosed with
breast cancer, the parties decided to begin IVF “to preserve [w]ife’s
ability to conceive a child.” 92 As a result of chemotherapy and the
wife’s being forty-four years old, the embryos were most likely the
only way for the wife to become a biological parent. 93 The husband
opposed implantation of the embryos. 94 As an adopted child himself,
the husband was concerned that his potential child would suffer from
not having a relationship with his or her biological father.95 He also
claimed that he only participated in IVF as a safeguard for the wife to
have a biological child and he did not want to provide financial
support to a potential child born to his former wife from the
preembryos.96
The Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled in favor of the wife,
reasoning that the “pre-embryos are likely [w]ife’s only opportunity
to achieve biological parenthood and her best chance to achieve
parenthood at all.”97 According to the court, the husband implicitly
agreed to IVF and could still be a part of the child’s life without
obligation to pay child support. 98 The court rejected the husband’s
argument that he only participated as a safeguard because his
participation also allowed the wife to become a genetic parent, which
was the purpose of the wife’s fighting for implantation.99 The court
indicated that it did not have to decide whether to implement the
constitutional approach or the contract approach because neither
party had signed the divorce portion of the consent form.100

91

42 A.3d 1131 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).
Id. at 1132.
93
Id. at 1442.
94
Id. at 1440.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 1442.
98
Id. at 1441 (“Husband also contends that the prospective child would be a
financial burden for him, and the trial court erred in concluding it had full equity
power to rely on Wife’s vow not to seek financial support from Husband if a child
is born . . . Husband’s concerns must be considered in light of Wife’s agreement to
do her best to assure that Husband never has to pay to support the child or
children.”).
99
Id. at 1440-41.
100
Id. at 1136.
92
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MUTUAL CONTEMPORANEOUS CONSENT

Under the mutual contemporaneous consent model, the two
parties have the power to decide what happens to the embryos, as
opposed to the constitutional approach where the court analyzes the
circumstances and makes its own decision about distribution. 101
Even though the power remains with the parties, as it does in the
contract approach, the mutual contemporaneous consent approach
allows the parties to change their minds as the situation changes. 102
The mutual contemporaneous consent model differs from the contract
approach in that it requires that “no transfer, release, disposition, or
use of the embryos can occur without the signed authorization of both
donors.”103 If the donors cannot agree, the embryos continue to be
cryopreserved104 in storage.105
A.

Iowa

In In re Marriage of Witten106 the wife asked the court for
custody of the embryos so that she could implant them to become a
biological parent.107 The husband opposed implantation of the
embryos into his former wife, but stated he would agree to their
donation.108 The court decided that it would be against public policy
to uphold the parties’ contract, forcing the husband to become a
parent, when he clearly changed his mind since the contract was

101

In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003).
Id. at 777.
103
Id. at 783.
Signed authorization is compulsory under the mutual
contemporaneous consent model. Id.
104
Petersen, supra note 15, at 1069 (“Cryopreservation entails maintaining the
embryos in a solution of liquid nitrogen ‘to protect the fertilized eggs from damage.
Frozen embryos are stored at . . . approximately -400 [degrees] F . . . .’ The ability
to cryopreserve affords couples greater flexibility in their family planning, as it
allows for the possibility of subsequent pregnancies without the woman having to
undergo additional cycles of ‘ovarian stimulation and retrieval,’ which is an
invasive and painful procedure. Moreover, if and when couples do decide to thaw
and to implant their stored embryos, the transfer procedure is identical to that
involving fresh embryos immediately following IVF.”).
105
Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 783.
106
Id. at 773.
107
Id. at 772.
108
Id.
102

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2021

13

Touro Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 2 [2021], Art. 13

870

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 37

created.109 Instead, because the contract no longer expressed the
husband’s desires, the court held that the embryos would remain in
cryopreservation indefinitely, until an agreement was reached by the
parties.110
B.

Criticisms of the
Consent Approach

Mutual

Contemporaneous

In Reber, the disposition of preembryos was an issue of first
impression.111 The Pennsylvania Superior Court analyzed three
different approaches used by other states to determine which
approach the Pennsylvania courts should use.112 It criticized the
mutual contemporaneous consent approach as “totally unrealistic.”113
The court noted that if the “parties could reach an agreement, they
would not be in court.”114
Additionally, although the mutual contemporaneous consent
approach emphasizes that “each partner [is] entitled to an equal say in
how the embryos should be disposed,” a stalemate puts all of the
power in the hands of the party opposing implantation. 115 First,
rather than the parties splitting the costs when an agreement cannot
be reached, the party that opposes thawing the preembryos is
responsible for the entire cost of keeping the preembryos
cryopreserved.116 Second, the party favoring destruction of the
preembyros may emotionally manipulate the other party or hold the
preembryos “hostage” by only agreeing to implantation in exchange
for money or property.117

109

Id. at 781.
Id. at 783.
111
Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131, 1134 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).
112
Id. at 1134-35.
113
Id. at 1142 n.5.
114
Id. at 1142.
115
Szafranski v. Dunston, 993 N.E.2d 502, 511 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (alteration in
original) (quoting In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 777 (Iowa 2003))
(explaining that an individual can contractually relinquish his fundamental rights
not to become a parent by signing a valid consent agreement); Mark P. Strasser,
You Take the Embryos but I Get the House (and the Business): Recent Trends in
Awards Involving Embryos upon Divorce, 57 BUFFALO L. REV. 1159 (2009).
116
Strasser, supra note 115, at 1210.
117
Id.
110
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CONTRACT APPROACH

The contract approach enforces the consent form, filled out by
the parties prior to IVF, as a binding and valid agreement regarding
disposition of the preembryos.118 Under the contract approach,
“agreements between progenitors, or gamete donors, regarding
disposition of their pre-zygotes should generally be presumed valid
and binding, and enforced in any dispute between them.” 119 The
contract approach allows the parties to determine their own plan for
disposition of the embryos in the case of divorce, as opposed to the
court’s plan.120 Courts that follow the contract approach enforce a
valid agreement between the parties that specifies the disposition of
the embryos in the case of divorce. 121 The courts using the contract
approach do not analyze either party’s constitutional rights to have or
to not have a child, instead carrying out the parties’ intention and
purpose in forming the contract. 122
A.

New York

New York follows the contractual approach to disposition of
the preembryos as shown in the following cases. In Kass v. Kass, the
former husband and wife had five frozen preembryos in storage.123
The wife was fighting for sole custody of the preembryos so that she
could conceive a child. 124 The consent form, filled out prior to the
parties’ IVF attempts, stated that the preembryos were to be donated
in a situation where the parties were unable to agree on disposition. 125
The husband counterclaimed and requested specific performance for
embryo donation based on the consent agreement. 126
The New York Court of Appeals held that the consent form
filled out by the parties that expressed their intent for disposition of
the preembryos is normally “valid and binding, and enforced in any
118

Alenick, supra note 70, at 1887.
Kass v. Kass, 91 N.Y.2d 554, 565 (N.Y. 1998).
120
Id.
121
Sarah Holman Loy, Responding to Reber: The Disposition of Pre-Embryos
Following Divorce in Pennsylvania, 122 PENN. STATE L. REV. 545, 552-53 (2018).
122
Kass, 91 N.Y.2d at 567.
123
Id. at 557.
124
Id. at 560.
125
Id. at 567.
126
Id.
119
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dispute between them.”127 The consent form that was signed by both
husband and wife, “unequivocally manifest[ed] their mutual
intention” to donate the embryos in the case of divorce. 128 The court
noted that the consent form contained “words of shared
understanding— ‘we,’ ‘us’ and ‘our,’” that showed that both parties
were in agreement about the disposition that was explained in the
consent form.129 Both parties stipulated that they signed the IVF
consent form of their own free will and according to their accurate
intentions.130 Therefore, the court upheld the consent form, which
provided that the preembryos would be donated for research in the
case of divorce.131
Following Kass, the court in Finklestein v. Finklestein upheld
the consent form because it expressed the parties’ intention in the
case of divorce.132 The consent form stated that the preembryos were
for the parties’ sole use, with the option of either party to “revoke
such consent.”133 The husband filled out a form from the IVF
program on which he wrote, “revoking my consent to use of any of
my genetic material, including the embryo created with Batel Yishay
Finklestein” (his wife). 134 The court explained that, under the
consent agreement, either party could change his or her mind and
withdraw consent, whether it related to the storage of the embryos or
the implantation of the embryos. 135 In Finklestein, a party had to
revoke his or her consent to prevent the other party from using the
preembryos.136 In contrast, under the mutual contemporaneous
consent approach both parties must contemporaneously sign an
authorization for use of the preembryos. The court enforced the
contract and refused to allow the wife to implant the preembryos
because the husband revoked his consent as allowed under the
agreement.137 Instead, the court granted the husband custody of the
preembryos to destroy them. If the consent form did not have a
127

Id. at 565 (citing Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d. 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992)).
Id. at 567.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 566.
131
Id. at 569.
132
Finklestein v. Finklestein, 162 A.D.3d 401 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018).
133
Id. at 402-03.
134
Id. at 402.
135
Id. at 403.
136
Id. at 401-02.
137
Id. at 404.
128
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provision for revoking consent, the husband would be unable to
revoke his consent and the wife would be able to use the preembryos
to implant without his contemporaneous consent. 138
Following the precedent in Kass, the Supreme Court of New
York County in Heldt v. Watnik139 upheld a consent form that gave
one party custody of the preembryos and allowed for implantation
against the other party’s wishes. 140 The parties executed three of the
same consent agreements, prior to IVF, which stated that the embryos
are “joint property” and therefore the IVF center “will not permit
embryo(s) designated as joint property to be used without the consent
of both [parties].”141 However, the consent agreements also stated
that, in the event of separation of the parties, the preembryos would
go to the woman, who could then use them for implantation. 142
Although the court held that the contract was unambiguous, it can be
argued that the contact’s contradictory language created the
ambiguity. Treating the preembryos as joint property or granting
custody to the woman in the case of separation are inconsistent.
However, the court decided that the consent form was unambiguous
and could be upheld because it “expressly outlined three scenarios in
which the parties are to choose a specific disposition plan,” one
scenario being the separation of the parties.143 Following the terms of
the consent form, the court granted custody of the preembryos to the
woman.144
B.

Washington

Implementing the contract approach, the Supreme Court of
Washington in In re Litowitz 145 chose to enforce the consent form
signed by both parties.146 The preembryos were created with an egg
from a donor, which was fertilized with the husband’s sperm. 147
Although the wife was not a biological parent, the husband and wife
138

Id. at 403-04.
No. 651464/2018, 2019 WL 2371882, at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 5, 2019).
140
Id.
141
Id. at *1-2.
142
Id. at *2.
143
Id. at *4.
144
Id. at *5.
145
48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002).
146
Id. at 270-71.
147
Id. at 262.
139
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were the “intended parents” and they were in charge of making
decisions regarding disposition of the preembryos.148 The egg donor
contract executed by the wife, husband, and the egg donor gave the
wife equal rights to the embryos, even though the embryos were not
biologically hers.149 After the divorce, the husband wanted to donate
the embryos to another couple, while the wife intended to have the
preembryos implanted in a surrogate. 150
The parties indicated in the consent agreement that, after the
preembyros had been frozen in storage for five years, they should be
thawed and “not allowed to undergo further development,” unless the
parties extended the length of the storage. 151 To change the consent
agreement, both parties had to agree. 152 Under the contract, because
five years passed from both the date of the contract and the date of
the implantation of the other preembryos from their IVF procedure,
and because neither party requested that the five-year period be
extended, the embryos should have been thawed. 153 The court upheld
the contract.154

VI.

PUBLIC POLICY REGARDING FORCED PARENTHOOD
A.

Massachusetts

Massachusetts prohibits the use of preembryos by either party
if it would require one party to unwillingly become a parent which
would be against public policy. 155 This public policy prevails over a
contractual agreement made by the parties which would compel one
of the parties to become a parent against his or her wishes. 156 In
2000, Massachusetts became the first and only state that applied this
policy.157
148

Id. at 263.
Id. at 267.
150
Id.
151
Id. at 263-64.
152
Id. at 270-71.
153
Id. at 269.
154
Id. The court noted that it was unknown if the preembyros had already been
thawed or if they were still in existence. Id.
155
A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000).
156
Id.
157
Id. at 1058.
149
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In A.Z. v. B.Z.,158 the Supreme Court of Massachusetts
invalidated a consent form filled out prior to the IVF process. 159
Prior to the first IVF treatment, the husband and wife filled out the
consent form that stated that in the case of separation, the preembryos
would be given to the wife for implantation. 160 The wife gave birth
to twins after the couple participated in IVF treatment for three
years.161 Before every subsequent treatment, the husband signed a
blank consent form and then the wife would fill in the information
with the same provision in case of separation. 162 When the couple
separated, there were four frozen preembryos in storage. 163 The
husband filed a motion to prevent the wife from thawing and
implanting them.164
The wife wanted the consent form upheld four years after the
husband signed it.165
During those four years, the parties’
circumstances changed significantly because they divorced. 166 It was
unclear if the husband intended the wife to receive the embryos in the
case of “separation,”167 because only the wife filled out the forms
stating that she would receive the preembryos in the case of
separation.168 The consent form never outlined the terms of the
parties’ intent for raising the child, such as custody and child support,
if in the case of separation, the wife did have a child.169 The court
ruled that the consent form could not be upheld. 170 Additionally, the
court affirmed the judgement of the Suffolk County Probate and
158

725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000).
Id. at 1058.
160
Id. at 1054.
161
Id. at 1053.
162
Id. at 1057.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id. at 1056-57.
166
Id. at 1057.
167
Id. (“Separation and divorce have distinct legal meanings. Legal changes occur
by operation of law when a couple divorces that do not occur when a couple
separates. Because divorce legally ends a couple’s marriage, we shall not assume,
in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that an agreement on this issue
providing for separation was meant to govern in the event of a divorce.”).
However, the parties could argue that there is little distinction between divorce and
separation pursuant to the order in this case.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id.
159
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Family Court which granted a “permanent injunction in favor of the
husband, prohibiting the wife ‘from utilizing’ the frozen preembryos
held in cryopreservation at the clinic.”171
The court went even further than resolving the issues between
the parties.172 More broadly, the court refused to uphold any consent
form that would compel an unwilling party into parenthood. 173 Even
if a party entered into a valid agreement to participate in IVF
treatments and allowed his partner to implant the preembryos in the
case of divorce, “prior agreements to enter into familial relationships
(marriage or parenthood) should not be enforced against individuals
who subsequently reconsider their decisions.” 174 Agreements for
distribution of preembryos in the case of divorce are not per se
invalid.175 As long as the distribution agreement does not violate
public policy, the parties can mutually decide distribution. 176 The
law should not be able to compel the husband to become a parent
with his former spouse four years after they signed the consent form,
during which time the parties divorced. 177
The court noted that contracts will not be upheld if “the public
interest in freedom of contract is . . . outweighed by other public
policy considerations.”178 It relied on a Massachusetts statute that
prohibits contracts binding an individual into “familial relationships”
that include marriage and parenthood. 179
In addition, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court had previously refused to uphold
contracts that “bind individuals to future family relationships.”180
B.

Arizona

On the other hand, in March 2018, Arizona passed a law
stating that in deciding disposition of frozen preembryos, courts must
“award the in vitro human embryos to the spouse who intends to

171

Id. at 1053.
Id. at 1057.
173
Id.
174
Id. at 1062.
175
Id.
176
Id. at 1055.
177
Id.
178
Id. at 1058.
179
Id.
180
Id.
172
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allow the in vitro human embryos to develop to birth.”181 Even if the
parties have a valid agreement providing for the disposition upon
divorce, the court must award the preembryos to the party who
intends to have a child, regardless of whether the contractual
agreement provides otherwise. 182 Arizona’s public policy prevails
over the terms of the contract.183
VII.

ARGUMENT: NEW YORK SHOULD ADOPT THE MODIFIED
MUTUAL CONTEMPORANEOUS APPROACH
A.

Implementing the Mutual Contemporaneous
Consent Approach over the Massachusetts’ Public
Policy and Constitutional Approach

The Massachusetts’ public policy approach and the mutual
contemporaneous consent approach prevent unwanted parenthood by
preventing a person from being forced into a familial relationship.
However, the mutual contemporaneous consent approach is
preferable because it protects against unwanted parenthood and
solves the issue of disposition of the preembryos. The public policy
approach only mandates that parties cannot be forced into parenthood
but does not direct disposition of the preembryos. In A.Z., after
establishing the public policy approach, the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts affirmed the probate court’s decision to decide
disposition under the constitutional approach, rather than establishing
a standard method of disposition under the public policy approach. 184
If New York decided to implement the same public policy approach,
it would require an additional approach to determine disposition.
Therefore, this approach is not enough to completely solve the
problem of disposition.

181

ARIZ. REV. STAT. §25-318.03 (LexisNexis 2018).
Id.
183
Id.
184
A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1054-55.
182
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Modification of the Mutual Contemporaneous
Consent Approach

As a solution to the valid criticisms 185 of the mutual
contemporaneous approach, New York should implement a default
rule that the preembryos are thawed if the parties do not come to a
contemporaneous agreement. The default thawing rule provides an
incentive for the parties to revisit distribution discussions upon
divorce and prevents preembryos from remaining in storage
permanently in the absence of an agreement. If the parties do not
decide disposition within five years of divorce, the preembryos
should be considered abandoned by both parties and thawed. If
neither party contemporaneously objects to the consent agreement’s
disposition, the consent agreement then determines disposition.
Adding a default rule for thawing the preembryos if the
parties cannot create a disposition plan after divorce also reduces the
problem of abandoned preembryos. 186 Under the traditional mutual
contemporaneous consent approach, preembryos are often stuck in
“legal limbo” because they are frozen in storage indefinitely until
disposition is decided by the parties or a court. 187 Although the exact
number of abandoned preembryos across the United States has not
been determined, fertility experts estimate that hundreds of thousands
of preembryos have been abandoned 188 and left frozen in storage for
years on end because there is no limit or rule that requires
preembryos to be thawed after a period of time. 189
Dr. Robert Nachtigall’s study of fifty-eight couples with an
average of 7.1 preembryos in storage per couple found “after an
185

See discussion supra Part IV.B.
Mary Pflum, Nation’s fertility clinics struggle with a growing number of
abandoned embryos, NBC NEWS (Aug. 19, 2019, 4:34 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/health/features/nation-s-fertility-clinics-strugglegrowing-number-abandoned-embryos-n1040806.
187
Id.
188
Though the exact definition varies from clinic to clinic, “an abandoned embryo
generally refers to a situation in which a patient has not paid storage fees related to
a frozen embryo for five or more years and fails to respond to letters and calls from
the clinic.” Id.
189
Id. Clinics are reluctant to discard frozen preembryos, even if the storage fees
are no longer paid or whether there is a contract in place providing for the
preembryos to be discarded after a period of time. Id. Clinics do not want to be
liable or to receive bad press for thawing preembryos that would have been used.
Id.
186
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average of 4.2 years of cryopreservation, seventy-two percent of
couples still had not made a decision on the disposition of their
embryos.”190 Although there may be no harm caused to the
undecided parties by leaving preembryos in storage indefinitely, a
time limit on the duration of preembryo storage is necessary to
protect infertility doctors.191 By leaving preembryos indefinitely in
storage, the burden of deciding whether and when the preembryos
should be destroyed does not disappear. 192 Instead, the burden to
dispose of the preembryos shifts to doctors or the heirs of the parties
long after the parties die. 193 Even if the preembryos are not
abandoned and the parties die with preembryos remaining in storage,
it would still be up to whoever inherits their estate to decide
disposition, potentially shifting the burden to their living children or
parents.194 Although doctors can legally destroy the preembryos if
they are abandoned, many doctors “will not destroy the embryos for
fear that the couple will return and demand their embryos.”195 In the
event that the couple returns, the doctor who destroyed the
preembryos could be sued, even for something “as serious as
wrongful death.”196 On the other hand, a doctor, who keeps the
abandoned preembryos in storage, he or she would have to pay the
cost of storage.197
A rule mandating that frozen preembryos must be thawed
after five years of storage is not unprecedented. In 1990, England
passed the Human Fertilization and Embryology Act of 1990
(“HFEA”).198 HFEA established a five-year limit for storage of
preembryos, after which the government destroys the preembryos. 199
Additionally, the American Society for Reproductive Medicine’s
(“ASRM’s”) view is that there should be a specific time limit on

Molly O’Brien, Note and Comment, An Intersection of Ethics and Law: The
Frozen Embryo Dilemma and the Chilling Choice Between Life and Death, 32
WHITTIER L. REV. 171 (2010).
191
Id. at 184-85.
192
Id. at 185.
193
Id.
194
Id. at 185.
195
Id. at 173.
196
Id. at 187.
197
Id.
198
Id. at 174.
199
Id. at 174.
190
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preembryos being cryopreserved. 200 The ASRM agrees with the
HFEA time limit of five years for cryopreservation of preembryos.201
The New York legislature should follow both the HFEA and ASRM
and pass a five-year limit on frozen storage, with the government
destroying the preembryos after five years. This would encourage
parties to decide a disposition plan within five years and protect
fertility doctors from any potential lawsuits.
An argument against the mutual contemporaneous consent
approach is that parties who cannot have biological children on their
own and wish to implant the preembryos are inhibited from
exercising their fundamental right to become parents without the
consent of the other party. However, there are procedures to store
both eggs and sperm by themselves.202 If a party is undergoing IVF
to preserve the chance to have a child in the future because of age or
medical reasons, he or she is not precluded from individually freezing
either sperm or eggs. To avoid the issue of a party’s last hope for
having biological children being tied to his or her former spouse,
New York can mandate that IVF clinics also store the couples’
individual sperm and eggs. This would give each party a backup
option for having biological children if the other party did not want to
have a child from the preembryos.
C.

Why the Contract Approach is Not Effective in
New York

Under contract law, a party’s nonperformance can be excused
if “changed circumstances make enforcement of the agreement
unreasonable.”203 The court in A.Z. held that a married couple’s
divorce constituted changed circumstances that rendered the contract

200

Brandon J. Bankowski, M.D., Anne D. Lyerly, M.D., Ruth R. Faden, M.P.H.,
Ph.D., and Edward E. Wallach, M.D., The social implications of embryo
cryopreservation, 84 FERTILITY AND STERILITY 823 (2005).
201
Id.
202
Egg, Embryo, and Sperm Freezing, RED ROCK FERTILITY,
https://redrockfertility.com/egg-sperm-embryo-freezing/ (last visited Mar. 14,
2021).
203
Mark C. Haut, Divorce and the Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 28 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 493 ,153 (1999) (quoting John A. Robertson, Prior Agreements for
Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 51 OHIO ST. L. J. 407, 418 (1990)).
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unenforceable.204 The court reasoned that no contract shall be
“enforced in equity when intervening events have changed the
circumstances such that the agreement which was originally signed
did not contemplate the actual situation now facing the parties.” 205
Critics of the contract approach correctly argue that couples
undergoing IVF may not be able to “focus intelligently or
meaningfully on future contingencies,” when their one focus is on
conception.206 Part of this criticism also includes the issue that
parties may not know that they are filling out a legally binding
consent form, instead thinking of it as a medical form to be used only
by the IVF clinic. 207 The court in A.Z. stated that consent agreements
are primarily used to inform the couple of the “benefits and risks of
freezing” and for a written record of the couple’s plan for disposition
“at the time of execution.”208 Parties may not consider their options
as thoroughly and carefully as they would if they were aware that the
consent agreement may be legally binding.
Further, the court in JB pointed out that when a married
couple begins IVF, “they are unlikely to anticipate divorce or to be
concerned about the disposition of preembryos on divorce.” 209 A
party would likely not agree to a costly medical procedure to have a
child with her spouse if she anticipated that they would end up
divorcing. There are many reasons that an unanticipated divorce
could occur after the parties signed the consent form, an example
being infidelity by one party that is discovered after IVF. The
204

A.Z. v B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1055 (Mass. 2000); see Haut supra note 203, at
521. Under traditional contract law, the party opposing implantation could claim
that his or her purpose of signing the consent form to have a child with his or her
spouse was frustrated by the unforeseen event of divorce. The doctrine of changed
circumstances is often used to modify child custody or child support agreements.
Id.; T. Ward Chapman, Contracts-Frustration of Purpose, 59 MICH. L. REV. 98
(1960).
The Frustration of Purpose Doctrine provides an excuse for
nonperformance if: (1) the contract is not fully performed; (2) the purpose of the
frustrated party in entering the contract must be known to the other party; (3) an
event not reasonably foreseeable at the time of the contract must have occurred and
frustrated the party’s purpose; and (4) the risk was not assumed by the frustrated
party. See id.
205
A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1055.
206
John A. Robertson, Precommitment Strategies For Disposition of Frozen
Embryos, 50 EMORY L.J. 989, 994 (2002).
207
Id.
208
A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1054-55.
209
J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 715 (N.J. 2001).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2021

25

Touro Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 2 [2021], Art. 13

882

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 37

contract approach fails to consider the reality that couples beginning
IVF are not focused on future legal battles against each other, so
binding them to the consent agreement without any opportunity to
change their minds is inequitable.
In a divorce, any provisions in a prenuptial agreement
determining child support, custody, or visitation issues are void
because the agreement “cannot definitively address child support
issues or custody issues for unborn children.”210 New York courts
are obligated to determine the issues of child support, custody, and
visitation “based on circumstances at the time of a separation or
divorce” in the best interests of the divorcing parties’ children. 211
Although preembryos are not living children, they do have potential
for life, and any child born from the preembryos would be an
“unborn” child of the parties at the time the consent form agreement
was signed.212 Regardless, consent agreements do not “contain
provisions for custody, child support, and maintenance.” 213 Even if
the same provisions are not void in a IVF consent agreement, a party
who unwillingly becomes a parent could spend years in court to
determine his custody and support obligations for a child he did not
consent to being born. This imposes an unfair burden on a party
forced into parenthood that would be otherwise avoided if
distribution was determined at the time of divorce and both parties
had to consent to use of the preembryos.
Because New York follows the contract approach, the New
York Supreme Court New York County, following the precedent set
by Kass, restricted a party from exercising his fundamental right to
not have a child. The decision in Heldt unfairly binds the man to a
decision he made three years prior while he was in a relationship with
the other party.214 Becoming a parent is a life changing decision that
should be contemporaneously made. A party should not be forced
into becoming a parent based on a decision made when the
circumstances were vastly different. 215
210

Prenuptial Agreements, N.Y.C. BAR LEGAL REFERRAL SERV.,
https://www.nycbar.org/get-legal-help/article/family-law/maritalagreements/prenuptial-agreements (last visited Jan. 5, 2021).
211
Id.
212
842 S.W.2d at 595.
213
A.Z., 725 N.E.2d at 1054-55.
214
Heldt, No. 651464/2018, 2019 WL 2371882, at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 5, 2019).
215
Kathianne Boniello, Man fighting ex over frozen embryos: I know the pain of
growing up without a dad, N.Y. POST (April 21, 2018, 2:34 PM),
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The courts that bind parties to their original consent forms to
allow the decision of disposition to remain with the couple are
“flawed because it characterizes the right to privacy and procreative
liberty as the right of the couple rather than the right of two separate
individuals.”216 The Supreme Court held in Eisenstadt that an
individual has the right to decide to procreate or to not procreate. 217
This clearly establishes that the right of one individual to procreate is
not tied to either his or her spouse or former spouse. The length of
time between filling out a consent form and the former spouse
attempting to implant the preembryos should not matter. There could
be drastic changes in the relationship in a short amount of time. For
example, if one of the parties agrees to go through IVF, executes a
consent form, and then finds out his or her partner was cheating, the
circumstances are vastly different from the time of the execution of
the consent form. Either party should be able to change his or her
mind up until the implantation of the preembryos.
This approach should also be favored over the constitutional
approach, which rarely, but potentially, may side with the party who
desires to become a parent but cannot biologically become a parent
without use of the preembryos. 218 The constitutional approach is
insufficient because in some extreme circumstances it binds a party to
become a parent because his or her former spouse is incapable of
having a child even though the parties’ individual rights should not
be intertwined.
Further, outside of IVF, a person is not forced to become a
parent solely because his or her former spouse wishes to become a
biological parent. This same argument should translate to IVF as
well. Similar to natural methods of conceiving a child, parties should
https://nypost.com/2018/04/21/man-fighting-ex-over-frozen-embryos-i-know-thepain-of-growing-up-without-a-dad. The man fighting for his right to not become a
parent in Heldt expressed that he would feel “morally obligated” to help raise a
child that was genetically his child because of his single parent upbringing. Id. He
explained that the woman has other options to have exercised her right to become a
parent without infringing on his right to not have a child, such as: a donor sperm, a
donor sperm and egg, surrogacy, or adoption. Id.
216
Lawrence, supra note 56, at 729.
217
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); In Cleveland Board of Education,
the Supreme Court affirmed the decision in Eisenstadt, holding that it was the right
of an individual to make personal decisions in both marriage and family life.
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Fleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639 (1974).
218
See discussion supra III.D.
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have the right to consent to potentially conceiving a child in their
present state of mind, as opposed to a decision made years ago. In
the natural reproductive process, parties make the decision to
potentially conceive a child each time they engage in sexual
intercourse.219 They can avoid conceiving a child by choosing not to
engage in sexual intercourse, by using birth control, or by having an
abortion.220
A disposition method that does not allow for
contemporaneous decisions binds a party to decisions made before
divorce or separation, a significant change in circumstances. 221 This
separates IVF and other ART methods from the natural procreative
process because “‘[t]he decision whether to bear or beget a child’ can
no longer be conceived as an isolated decision.”222

VIII. BURDENS OF PARENTHOOD AND POTENTIAL METHODS OF
CONSENTING TO IMPLANTATION WITHOUT FORCED
PARENTHOOD
A.

Legal, Financial, and Emotional Burdens of
Raising a Child

Parenthood comes in three forms: gestational parenthood,
legal parenthood, and genetic parenthood. 223 In California, Texas,
and Washington, statutes “specify that if a fertilized preembryo is
implanted after the parties divorce, a former spouse (who contributed
genetic material) is not deemed to be the legal parent of any resulting
child if the former spouse does not contemporaneously consent to
implantation.”224 However, this policy does not protect parties who
219

Patricia A. Martin & Martin L. Lagod, The Human Preembryo, The Progenitors,
and the State: Toward a Dynamic Theory of Status, Rights, and Research Policy, 5
HIGH TECH L.J. 257, 290 (1990) (“In sum, given the relationship between the state,
the progenitors, and the preembryo, a deadlock between the progenitors should be
resolved by allowing the preembryos to deteriorate and die. Preembryo loss is the
price of the progenitors’ freedom and mutual dependence. The price may be high,
but it seems necessary to preserve our most personal rights and the integrity of our
most personal relationships.”).
220
Id. at 291.
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not to Procreate, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1135 (2008). Only women can be gestational parents. Id. at 1135.
224
Id. at 1146.
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underwent IVF procedures from being forced into parenthood after
they changed their minds about having a child from those embryos.225
The party opposing use of the embryos should be protected regardless
of whether the parties are married, separated or divorced. A party
who is either a genetic, gestational, or legal parent is unwillingly tied
to the child with legal, financial, or emotional burdens.
Under New York law, the legal relationship between a parent
and child is based on the parent’s obligation to financially care for the
child, the right to custody, and the right to make decisions regarding
the child’s upbringing.226 These legal obligations are the bare
minimum expected from a parent. There are many financial expenses
that come with raising a child. According to the United States
Department of Agriculture, in 2015, in a middle-class two child
family with married parents, the average cost of raising a child until
the age of seventeen was $233,216. 227 This is a substantial burden on
a party who does not want to become a parent. The financial
obligation is the only required burden on the parent, but it is not
likely the only burden actually created by the birth of a biological
child. Becoming a parent entails emotional burdens because “genetic
ties may form a powerful bond between an individual and his or her
progeny even if the progenitor is freed from the legal obligations of
parenthood.”228
In New York, when an unmarried woman has a child, the
child has no legal father unless paternity is established by (1) signing
a voluntary Acknowledgment of Paternity form or (2) petitioning a
225

Id.

226

Parental
Rights,
NYCOURTS.GOV
(Apr.
3,
2017)
https://nycourts.gov/Courthelp/Family/parentalRights.shtml.
227
Mark Lino, The Cost of Raising a Child, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., (Feb. 18, 2020),
https://www.usda.gov/media/blog/2017/01/13/cost-raisingchild#:~:text=Families%20Projected%20to%20Spend%20an,on%20Children%20b
y%20Families%2C%202015.
228
Martin & Lagod, supra note 219, at 290; see Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588,
604 (Tenn. 1992) (“[W]e can only conclude that Mary Sue Davis’s interest in
donation is not as significant as the interest Junior Davis has in avoiding
parenthood. If she were allowed to donate these preembryos, he would face a
lifetime of either wondering about his parental status or knowing about his parental
status but having no control over it. He testified quite clearly that if these
preembryos were brought to term he would fight for custody of his child or
children. Donation, if a child came of it, would rob him twice -- his procreational
autonomy would be defeated and his relationship with his offspring would be
prohibited.”).
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court to determine paternity. 229 The biological father of a child born
to an unmarried woman has no rights or responsibilities to the child,
unless paternity is established. 230 If the parties are still legally
married, the biological father is automatically presumed to be the
legal father.231 Potentially, if the parties were divorced, and the party
opposing the implantation was male, they could sign an agreement
not to acknowledge the paternity of the child so that the father has no
legal or financial obligations. However, this still does not solve the
problem of an emotional burden on the party opposing parenthood. If
the parties were still legally married however, the biological father
would be the legal father. 232
B.

Ex-Spouse as a Donor/Surrogate

New York State’s Child-Parent Security Act (“CPSA”),
effective as of February 15, 2021, changes legal parenthood in New
York from being defined by “traditional principles of biology,
marriage, and/or gestation” to “intent and consent” determining who
is a legal parent. 233 If the donor intends to donate an egg or sperm,
but does not intend to become a parent to a child born from the
donated gametes, the CPSA protects the donor from obligations to
the child.234 The CPSA establishes legal protections for children
born through ART by clarifying who the parents of a child born from
ART are and then establishing the financial and legal responsibilities
of the parents.235 The protections apply to cases in which one party
allows the other to use the IVF preembryos because New York’s
Family Court Act provides that “[d]onor also includes an individual
229

Paternity Establishment, THE OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF N.Y, STATE,
https://www.childsupport.ny.gov/dcse/paternity_establishment.html#:~:text=Every
%20child%20has%20a%20biological,establish%20paternity%20for%20the%20chi
ld (last visited Mar. 14, 2021).
230
Id.
231
Id.
232
Id.
233
Alexis L. Cirel, February 2021 Marks the Implementation of New York State’s
Child-Parent Security Act, SCHWARTZ SLADKUS REICH GREENBERG ATLAS LLP
(Dec. 18, 2020), https://ssrga.com/blog/february-2021-marks-the-implementationof-new-york-states-child-parent-security-act.
234
The Child-Parent Security Act in New York, FAMILY EQUAL.,
https://www.familyequality.org/resources/child-parent-security-act-newyork/#what-is-cpsa (last visited Feb. 28, 2021).
235
Id.
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who had dispositional control of an embryo who then transfers
dispositional control and relinquishes all present and future parental
and inheritance rights and obligations to a resulting child.” 236
The parties should be required to fill out a written donor
agreement in order to contractually agree to the terms of the donation.
A donor agreement details the party’s intentions and
responsibilities.237 It should also explicitly state that “the donor does
not intend to parent any child conceived” by the donated gametes.238
Additionally, the agreement should state that the donor does not want
either physical or legal custody of any children born from the
donation.239
The Uniform Parentage Act (“UPA”), a model statute
originally passed in 1973, only addressed artificial insemination in
situations where the woman was married, and the husband was to be
the father of the child. 240 Under the UPA, the sperm donor was not
considered the father under three conditions: the artificial
insemination was conducted under a physician’s supervision; the
husband gave his written consent; and the physician filed the consent
with the state health department. 241 The UPA was revised in 2000
and removed the requirement that the insemination must be
performed by a physician. 242 The 2000 revised UPA “clarified that
donors could not sue to establish parental rights or be sued and
required to support the resulting child.”243
The 2017 revised UPA drastically minimized the focus on
marriage or lack of marriage to govern sperm donation and instead
focused on allowing the intended parent to acknowledge parentage. 244
Before 2017, in states that have adopted the UPA, the revised UPA,
or have a similar statute, the intended parent rule did not apply if the
236

N.Y. FAM CT. ACT. LAW Art. 5-C §581-101 (2019).
Richard B. Vaughn, Assisted Reproductive Technology Law: 10 FAQs, AM. BAR
ASS’N,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/family_law/publications/familyadvocate/2019/summer/assisted-reproductive-technology-law-10-faqs (last visited
Feb. 27, 2021).
238
Id.
239
Id.
240
Lisa Luetkemeyer & Kimela West, Paternity Law: Sperm Donors, Surrogate
Mothers and Child Custody, 3 MO. MED. 112, 162 (2015).
241
Id.
242
Id.
243
Id. at 163.
244
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT 2017 § 301 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
237
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woman is unmarried or if the artificial insemination is not performed
by a doctor.245 This would not have been a valid option for a
biological father to avoid being legally responsible for the child. The
change to acknowledging intended parents in the 2017 revised UPA
may provide a solution in the case that the party against implantation
would consent to implantation and potential birth of his biological
child so long as he has no obligations to the future child.
C.

Adoption/Fostering

There are five different options for adopting: adopting
children from foster care, adopting children from other states,
adopting through an agency/attorney, adopting from outside the
United States, and adopting an adult. 246 In New York, adopting
through an agency can be expensive, costing approximately $20,000
to $45,000.247 This option may not be feasible for the party who
wants to exercise his or her constitutional right to have a child but
does not have the money to adopt through an agency.
However, New York State “subsidizes the cost of adopting
through the public foster care system, up to $2,000.”248 Parents who
adopt through the foster care system are given a monthly stipend
from the state until the child’s eighteenth birthday.249 Instead of
using the disputed preembryos, adoption through the foster care
system is a lower cost method of adoption for a party. Both adoption
and gamete donation are possible solutions for a party who wants to
have a child but faces opposition to the use of the preembryo by a
former spouse.

245

Id.
What Are My Choices in Adoption?, CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY,
https://www.childwelfare.gov/topics/adoption/adoptive/choices (last visited Nov.
22, 2020).
247
David Dodge, What I Spent to Adopt My Child, THE NY TIMES (Feb. 11, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/11/parenting/adoptioncosts.html#:~:text=An%2
0independent%20adoption%20can%20cost,fees%2C%20social%20workers%20an
d%20more.
248
Id.
249
Id.
246
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CONCLUSION

New York should abandon the contract approach because it
may force an unwilling person into parenthood. The decision to have
a child must be a decision that is contemporaneously made by both
parents, not a unilateral decision made by one of the parties.
Consequently, the parties must contemporaneously agree to
disposition of the preembryos as opposed to either party being bound
by a consent agreement signed in vastly different circumstances.
Generally, even though the mutual contemporaneous consent
approach allows the parties to contemporaneously give consent to
any decision regarding the preembryos, it does not give a solution for
when the parties are deadlocked. As long as the parties cannot agree,
the embryos cannot be removed from their frozen storage to be used
or disposed of. However, New York should implement the mutual
contemporaneous consent model with a default rule that after the
parties are divorced for five years, if they do not agree on disposition
of the preembryos, the preembryos are considered abandoned and are
thawed. In conclusion, New York should implement the mutual
contemporaneous consent approach with a default rule for thawing of
the preembryos if the parties cannot agree.
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